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THE THREAT OF CORPORATE DEBT
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1. Introduction
External financing of corporations historically involved cyclical patterns.
Corporations' debt to equity ratios generally deteriorated in recessions and
improved in recoveries. As a recession approached its end, corporations
typically restored their balance sheets, issued both debt and equity, and used
the proceeds to repay short-term debt and to rebuild their liquid assets. This
was the period where corporations tended to lengthen the maturity of their
debt (i.e. fund their debt). In the latter.part of a recovery, by which time
interest rates were usually high, corporations eschewed long-term debt and
instead sought short-term debt financing. Recently, many corporations have
deviated from this pattern and have fallen behind in restoring their balance
sheets.
In the post-Korean War period, the character of the corporate balance sheet
has changed significantly. In 1960, manufacturing corporations had slightly
more than $4 of equity per dollar of debt. The amount of equity per dollar of
debt has since declined to $2.07 [1]. The ratio of debt to total funds employed
and the ratio of short-term debt to total debt have both increased considerably.
At the end of the fourth quarter of 1960, the ratio of short-term debt to total
market debt was 29.5%. By the end of 1982, it had risen to 47.9% [2]. There
also has been a tremendous increase in the burden of debt servicing. In the
1960-1982 period, the interest coverage ratio, defined as pretax profits plus
interest payments divided by interest payments, fell from 14.4 to 2.7 [3]. This
decline indicates that pretax corporate profits were barely sufficient to cover
interest payments on debt. Not only is there a large debt on which to pay
interest, but the interest rates at which the funds have been borrowed have
risen markedly. In 1960, the average rate on long-term Treasury bonds was
4.01% [4]. For the same securities in 1982 the average rate was 12.76% [5].
• Professor of Finance, Wharton School. University of Pennsylvania.
I am indebted to my colleague Jamshed Ghandi for reminding me that the threat of corporate
debt must be viewed in the broad rather than the narrow context.
0167-9333/84/S3.00 0 1984. Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. (North-Holland)

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

M. Mendelson / The threat of corporate debt

Furthermore, the average maturity of debt has declined, which has caused the
debt to be turned over more frequently [6]. Finally, the liquidity ratio of firms,
the ratio of liquid assets to short-term credit market debt, has declined
substantially from 113.7% in 1960 to a mere 37.7% in 1982 [7]. The deterioration of U.S. corporate balance sheets indicates that firms are becoming more
highly leveraged, less liquid, and increasingly compelled to borrow for short
time periods.
These conditions have combined to increase the probability of widespread
default. Many observers of the capital markets, such as Henry Kaufman, have
expressed great concern over these developments [8]. This article assesses the
factors which have caused the deterioration of corporate financial health and
assesses the significance of that situation.

2. The fragility of international finance
French and German analysis of what the Americans call business cycles is
called conjuncture analysis; the conjunctures of circumstances which result in
the economies becoming very fragile. The current conjuncture of circumstances
poses significant risks for the international financial system. In brief, many
corporations are financially vulnerable and consequently unable to withstand
any significant shock. Concurrently, banks on the international scene, having
discovered liability management, also have stretched their leverage. The banks
have found that after an orgy of international lending, they hold billions of
dollars of loans of dubious value. The adequacy of the capital of banks is of
considerable concern, especially that of U.S. banks to U.S. authorities.
Some of the countries to which the money was lent are on the verge of
default and efforts are being made to prevent such occurrences. In fact,
defaults have already occurred which, for very good reasons, no one is willing
to admit. The banks are reluctant to declare a default and go through the
fruitless motions of trying to collect the funds due because if the banks declare
the loans in default they will have to write the debts off. The banks simply do
not have enough equity to absorb such writeoffs. The loans of the five largest
banks in the Unites States (as measured by capital) to Argentina, Brazil,
Mexico, Venezuela, and Chile at the end of 1982 constituted from 141 to 263%
of their capital. The loans of three of those banks to Brazil and Mexico alone
exceeded 100% of their capital [9].
The banks have been compelled to engage in forms of involuntary credit
extension. Initially, when countries such as Brazil and Argentina began to have
difficulties servicing their debt, they were lent the money with which to make
the payments due. This extension of credit was not actually voluntary, but was
forced on the banks by the need to avoid declaring a default. Some countries,
however, have begun to fail to make the requisite payments and consequently
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many banks are reluctant to extend further credit. The reluctance of the banks
to declare even these countries in default is also a form of involuntary credit
extension. However, with the general improvement in the economic climate
that has taken place in 1983, the prospects for increased exports, and therefore
an improved ability to cope with debt, have brightened considerably.
Under these circumstances a number of scenarios could occur. First, everyone simply could ignore these developments. Banks would merely record a
decline in profitability because they would not be paid the full interest coming
to them. If the world economy improves sufficiently, financial disaster may be
avoided. Second, there could be a loss of confidence in the banks. If the banks
are not helped by a massive infusion of central bank funds, a major international financial crisis could result. Third, there could be a loss of confidence
accompanied by central bank intervention to avoid an international crisis. This
could produce a raging inflation.
Even the first scenario, however, could necessitate a massive infusion of
funds through central bank intervention. For example, the banks, recognizing
the precariousness of their positions, might cut loans to firms with precarious
financial structures. Those firms could then run into difficulties. They could
find themselves unable to pay other creditor banks. Unlike sovereign governments, corporations can go bankrupt, and upon default, the banks cannot deny
the worthlessness of the loans extended. Writing off these debts could deplete
the equity of the banks. In the absence of Federal Reserve intervention, such
developments could precipitate a domino effect which would not be confined
to the borders of the United States and which could precipitate an international financial crisis. Consequently, a likely development would be a massive
infusion of funds and the fueling of a potentially damaging inflation.
The financial problems emerging from the banks' extension of credit to
countries that are now unable to repay are exacerbated by some uncomfortable
economic circumstances. As noted above, sovereign governments do not go
bankrupt. There are few assets that can be seized by creditors. The only way in
which the debtor countries can meet their debt obligations is by a significant
expansion of their exports. Unfortunately, although the world economy is
improving, expanding imports is difficult because of the protectionist mood of
many of the countries to which the debtors would naturally export. The free
world seems to have become convinced that the only way to curb inflation is to
curb the money supply regardless of the impact on employment. Indeed,
monetarists count on unemployment to reduce the upward pressure on prices.
Unfortunately, labor in industries with foreign competition tries to minimize
the unemployment by pressing for protectionist measures which, if implemented, make it impossible for the debtor countries to extricate themselves
from their difficulties. In addition, those who suggest that these debtor
countries curb imports and impose an austerity program overlook the political
reality of those countries. A banking consortium's attempt to impose such
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austerity can destroy the political stability of the country and make it possible
for less level-headed elements of the population to take over and foolheartedly
declare a moratorium which the banks could no longer ignore.
Distorted corporate financial structures pose a significant threat to a very
fragile international financial order. If the financial difficulties encountered by
a firm trigger an adverse financial reaction throughout the economy, refunding
can be made difficult for other firms. This, in turn, may jeopardize the banks
and interfere with monetary policy. For example, in the aftermath of the Penn
Central bankruptcy, Chrysler found financing difficult and the Federal Reserve had to step in with remedial measures which increased the money supply.
The possibilities of generating financial panic are increased when corporations
rely heavily upon short-term funds and the banks have thin capital and carry
debts which perhaps should have been written down. The necessity for
renewing loans gives rise to the occasions on which panic may occur.
Thus, the weakness of the real sector, the fragility of the financial structure
of the real sector (i.e. of non-financial corporations), and the weakness of the
banking system have all come together. This conjuncture raises multi-dimensional implications regarding domestic capital, stabilization policy, and the
stability of the economy. Unfortunately, an examination of most of these is
beyond the scope of this paper. Discussion is confined to the financial
structure of corporations, the transmission mechanism by which the risk of the
real sector gets transmitted to the financial sector. If the burden of corporate
debt merely threatened the ability of a number of corporations to continue
operating, the fears expressed by observers such as Kaufman would be
exaggerated. However, in the context discussed above, the threat of corporate
debt becomes menacing.

3. Factors in the decay of corporate balance sheets
3.1. Inflation and the corporate income tax

A number of factors have contributed to the deterioration of corporate
balance sheets in the United States. Corporate tax rates and inflation, especially in combination, encouraged corporations to substitute debt for equity.
Consider an interest rate of 10%, consisting of 3% reflecting a real rate of
interest and 7% reflecting compensation for anticipated inflation. Imagine a
loan of $100 for one year at a rate of 10% when inflation is proceeding at the
rate of 7%. In real terms, unless the investor receives $107 in return for every
$100 lent, his principal will deteriorate. The $7 of "additional interest" is thus
not really a payment of interest at all, but a repayment of principal [10]. The
whole $10, however, is considered a payment of interest for tax purposes. At a
50% tax rate, the after-tax cost of servicing a $100 debt is only $5. In effect, the
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borrower repays only 98% of the real value of the loan. The government
subsidizes the remaining 2%. Thus, borrowed funds, far from costing money,
actually have a negative real rate of interest. Under the circumstances that
have prevailed in recent years, it is hardly surprising that corporations substituted debt for equity and the debt to equity ratio increased.
Two recent developments may halt or reverse the deterioration of corporate
balance sheets. First, the tax rate applicable to corporations has declined
significantly. Many corporations presently pay a very low rate of tax. Accordingly, the subsidy available to corporations through interest deductibility is
reduced. Consider the example given above, with a 3% real rate and a 7%
inflation compensation. If the tax rate is only 20%, it costs $8 to service a $100
loan. With a 7% inflation rate, the real cost of funds is now 1% rather than
- 2%. At the present time, when the real rate appears to be a major component
of the nominal rate, the advantage of using debt is reduced even more.
Returning to our example of a $100 loan at 10%, if the inflation rate is 3% and
the real rate is 7%, with a 50% tax rate, the real rate is +2%. With a 20% tax
rate, the net real cost of funds rises to 5%. Assuming that corporations respond
to these inducements to reduce reliance on debt, the question remains as to
whether the collapse of the financial system will be delayed long enough to
enable corporations to strengthen their financial structures and thereby
strengthen the financial system itself.
The pace of inflation accelerated, first because of the Vietnam War, then
because of the energy crisis, and finally from its own momentum. The
consequence was not only higher interest rates, but also depressed equity
prices. In 1972 the Standard and Poor index of the stock market peaked at
approximately 110. Not until 1980 did the market recover significantly. Even if
the effective interest rate had not been negative, corporations would not have
been very willing to issue equity. Since the 1951 Treasury-Federal Reserve
accord, interest rates have drifted upward. Time and again, corporations
postponed funding their liabilities because interest rates were high, hoping that
they would be able to fund when interest rates subsequently declined. Unfortunately, interest rates kept climbing, although not monotonically, and the
opportunities for funding were scarce. Frequently, when interest rates started
to fall, corporations rushed into the market, checking the fall.
3.2. High debt-equity ratios in a high interest rate environment
3.2.1. Preferencefor short-term debt
In a high interest rate environment, investors tend to prefer to invest in
fixed income securities rather than equities. High rates tend to be associated
with high volatility, which shifts investor preference to short-term fixed income
investments. The high interest costs cause the interest component of corporate
expenses to increase and thus to depress profits. Corporations also are re-
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luctant to encumber themselves with such high costs for extended periods and
thus seek short-term financing. The need to resort to short-term debt creates
problems with rolling over the debt, because the assets financed by the debt
will require continued financing long after the original debt matures.
Even when corporations do not resort to strict short-term financing, they
tend to increase their use of financing technqiues that involve some increase in
the turnover of debt. The floating rate note is typical. The note is attractive
because it reduces the lender's interest rate exposure while reducing the
borrower's roll-over risk. It permits the lender to make the equivalent of
short-term loans while protecting the borrower, to a limited extent, from an
inability to roll over the loan. A floating rate note is the equivalent of a
sequence of short-term loans in which renewal is guaranteed. While shifting
from long-term debt into floating rate notes with maturities of five or even ten
years does not increase the debt service burden as significantly as switching to
short-term financing, it still results in a more frequent turnover of debt than
the financing that would have occurred in a low interest rate environment.
3.2.2. Potentialadverse effects of shorteningdebt maturities
Shortening maturity tends to produce a Catch-22 situation. High interest
rates reduce the earnings coverage of interest. To avoid being permanently
saddled with such a reduction, many corporations switch to short-term funds.
Because short-term funds often have an even higher cost than long-term funds
in a high interest rate environment, the interest coverage is reduced even more.
Because of the fall in interest coverage, the corporate debt ratings are reduced.
Because the ratings are reduced, the interest costs rise even more.
Another difficulty with high debt-equity ratios is that the flexibility of the
firm is reduced. At any particular degree of leverage, the rate of growth of the
firm depends upon the return on assets and the rate of interest. If interest rates
rise, the growth of the firm can be maintained by increasing leverage. If
leverage is already high, however, the firm may be unable to further increase its
leverage as a means of improving the return on equity because of the large rise
in its interest payments resulting from the deterioration of the company's
creditworthiness. For the economy as a whole, however, resultant increases in
the probability of bankruptcy can be a catharsis. They can eliminate inefficient
firms and make room for the growth of more efficient ones.
In addition, given that the attractiveness of a proposed capital expenditure
is a function of the expected return on that asset compared with the cost of
funds, there is a rate risk involved in mismatching maturities. This is clearly
seen in the case of a financial institution. If a financial institution finances a
loan with funds of a shorter maturity, it runs the risk that when its own
borrowing has to be refinanced, the rate it will have to pay will exceed the rate
being earned on the loan originally made by that institution. An industrial firm
is in exactly the same position. If an asset was worthwhile acquiring when it
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could be financed at a rate of 4%, it may not be worthwhile holding if the net
interest cost should rise. There is some virtue in financing the asset with a loan
which has a maturity comparable to the economic life of the asset.
If, as a consequence of increased obsolescence, the economic life of the asset
declines, a decline in the maturity of corporate debt would hardly have an
ominous significance. If, however, because of the high debt-equity ratio,
business firms become reluctant to take risk and thus prefer assets with shorter
economic lives, the declining maturity of corporate debt becomes reflective of a
malaise which merits concern. In addition, corporations may shorten their debt
because the market is less willing to accept the maturities which the corporations prefer to issue. Taken overall, the decline in the maturity of corporate
debt may reflect a significant reduction in the health of corporations.
The shortening of the maturity has another adverse impact on the economy.
Rolling over debt is not a costless operation. A shortening of the maturity and
an increase in the frequency of rolling over the debt means that more resources
of the economy have to be shifted into the financial sector and this increases
the overall cost of operating the economy.
These factors may combine to depress equity prices and, in turn, to
discourage corporations from using equity to finance expansion. In this type of
environment, management views the equity of the firm as underpriced.
3.3. Differentialeffects of high leverage on firms
3.3.1. Business risk and financialrisk
A high degree of financial leverage affects firms in different ways depending
on the firm's income stream. Even a moderately fluctuating revenue stream can
give rise to a fairly volatile net operating income if substantial fixed operating
costs exist. The amount of financial leverage that a firm can tolerate is a
function of this basic business risk. Interest is paid out of the net operating
income. For a firm with a relatively stable income stream, the ratio of interest
to total expenses can be higher than otherwise.
It is not clear that corporations, in their pursuit of higher debt-equity
ratios, recognized that business generally has become more risky. Business risk
has increased as a result of the growing intensity of recessions, increased
international competition, and the acceleration of the obsolescence of production equipment. These factors affect the volatility of revenues, and, given the
structure of fixed costs, there is an increase in business risk. Because the
amount of financial leverage a firm can tolerate depends on business risk, the
corporate response to the developments listed above should have been either to
reduce debt-equity ratios or decelerate growth. Neither alternative has occurred. As described in section 1, debt-equity ratios have actually increased.
Also, although it is unclear whether managements decided to slow their firm's
growth, it is clear that growth continued.
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Business firms were able to expand their debt-equity ratios because the
environment was conducive to businesses increasing their leverage. It is not
clear that the financial community recognized that risk increased as a consequence. If the financial sector wished to lend funds to a particular industry, a
firm which kept pace with the increase in the debt-equity ratio with the other
firms in the industry was not likely to be penalized.
3.3.2. Financingstrategies in an inflationary and high interest rate environment
It is literally impossible for a firm without any debt to go bankrupt. With a
small amount of debt, a firm's cash flow can cover all debt service charges,
including any repayment of principal in the foreseeable future. Such firms are
said to be engaged in hedge financing [11]. As the debt-equity ratio grows,
there comes a point at which it can be anticipated that there will be times when
the debt can be serviced only by rolling over maturing debt. Such firms are
said to be engaged in speculative financing [12]. Finally, the situation can so
deteriorate that the cash flow will not even cover interest payments in all
foreseeable periods and the firm can anticipate having to borrow to make those
payments. This can easily be recognized as Ponzi financing [13].
Clearly, the debt-free firm is impervious to variations in interest rates and
many firms engaging in speculative financing are almost impervious. However,
the latter group will include firms that only marginally qualify for inclusion. A
sufficient increase in interest rates or a setback in sales can drive them into the
group engaging in Ponzi financing, which has to borrow even to make interest
payments. With rising interest rates, the financing of the last group becomes
increasingly precarious.
Insofar as high interest rates reflect an inflationary environment, firms with
high ratios of liquid assets to debt will be adversely affected as compared to
firms with low ratios. While a major reason business firms have become
relatively illiquid in the inflationary environment we have experienced in the
last decade or so is the attempt to utilize funds more efficiently, there may also
have been an attempt to reduce liquid balances in order to minimize the
adverse effect of inflation on liquid assets. An aspect of high interest rates
generally overlooked, however, is that the economic value of long-lived capital
assets declines more than the economic value of the liabilities, if these liabilities
have sufficiently short maturities. This is reflected in a profit squeeze.
If all firms increased their debts pari passu as inflation increases and as
interest rates rise, output presumably is priced to reflect the higher cost of
funds. However, insofar as different firms issue debt at different times, some
first may find themselves at competitive disadvantages. Thbse firms which
manage to acquire long-term funds at a low cost have a clear advantage over
other firms which need to raise funds in periods of high interest rates. The
latter find that they will be at a permanent disadvantage relative to the other
firms in the industry if they raise long-term funds in such an environment.
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However, if they raise short-term funds while they are only at a temporary
disadvantage, that disadvantage may be even greater because frequently the
yield curve is inverted in a high interest rate environment [14].
In addition, the shortening of the maturity of the liabilities relative to the
assets makes the firms more vulnerable to equity erosion, in the true economic
sense, when interest rates rise. As noted, although it is not reflected on the
books of the corporation, the present values of the cash flows generated by the
assets and liabilities both decline when interest rates rise. Because distant flows
are more severely affected by increases in interest rates than nearby flows, if
the maturity of the debt is reduced relative to the maturity of the economic
lives of the assets, the present value of the assets is depressed more than the
present value of the liabilities.
One unfortunate consequence of the increase in the debt-service burden
associated with shorter maturities is that firms may be discouraged from
undertaking many long-term investments and may be placed at a competitive
disadvantage with respect to foreign competition. High interest rates appear to
be more volatile than low interest rates. This introduces an element of
uncertainty in the evaluation of long-run projects and reduces their attractiveness. Furthermore, the recent rise in real rates raises the question of whether
what is profitable now will be profitable over the life of the asset under
consideration. Thus, modernization of plants and the utilization of the state of
the art may be delayed in a high interest rate environment. It nevertheless has
been argued that because of technological changes, the economic life of assets
used by business has been shortened and business does not need funds with the
same long maturities that it needed hitherto [15]. The decline in the average
maturity appears not to be quite as consequential or as frightening as at first
glance. This, however, should not provide us with great comfort.
3.3.3. The debt threat and efficient firns
It is hardly inevitable that the firm that is least likely to get into trouble is
the efficient firm. As a consequence of the hazards of timing, the physically
efficient firm may find itself more heavily burdened by debt-service charges
than a relatively inefficient firm. It is quite possible under such circumstances
that bankruptcy will drive out, not the inefficient, but the efficient firm, thus
leading to a distortion in the allocation of resources.

4. Internal funds
The increase in the leverage of corporations appears to have been a
consequence of a downward drift in the ratio of internal funds to other funds.
The shift in sources was not to external equity but to debt. There are two ways
in which a firm may determine its pattern of finance. It may decide that it
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wants its equity in a particular area along the risk-return continuum. The
riskiness of the equity will be determined by the uncertainty associated with
the net income. That uncertainty, in turn, is determined by two factors: the
uncertainty associated with the net operating income and the degree of
financial leverage. Given a target level of the risk-return ratio, the less
uncertainty associated with the net operating income, the more financial
leverage the firm can have. Given the equity ratio that is thus established, the
firm's growth rate then depends upon the rate at which the supporting equity
grows.
Other firms take a slightly different approach. As is well known, the rate of
return on equity is determined by the rate of return on assets and the degree of
financial leverage. Thus, given the return on assets and the dividend requirements of the firm, some firms will, up to a point, choose the degree of leverage
that will finance the desired rate of growth.
A firm can make its equity grow at any target rate by the simple process of
issuing as much equity as is needed to achieve the particular rate of growth.
Most corporations, however, are reluctant to allow the number of shares
outstanding to grow indiscriminately. They view internal funds as the cheapest
source of funds and feel that external equity should be used only under special
circumstances. Firms will issue equity if opportunities for investment arise that
cannot be financed with internal equity and threaten to give competitors an
increasing share of the market. They will also issue equity if management is
convinced that the market price of the outstanding equity is high or when the
indigestion problem is diminished, as in the case of takeovers and mergers.
One can hypothesize about the cause for the decline in internal funds that
has been observed [16]. Internal funds as a proportion of total funds used can
decline either because profits have declined or because expenditures have risen.
It is quite possible that we have been witnessing an increase in the capital
intensity of our production processes and certainly there have been substantial
capital expenditures for environmental reasons which may contribute significantly to social net product but negatively to private net product. Quite
possibly, energy conservation implementations have increased capital intensity
and called for substantial capital expenditures.
To some extent, the decline in the use of internal funds between 1960 and
into the early 1970s can be attributed to the increase in corporate capital
expenditures. Similarly, the recovery in the late 1970s and early 1980s can be
attributed to the sluggish growth in investment spending. To some extent, the
fluctuations in utilization of internal funds reflect the fluctuations in corporate
profitability, coupled with the sluggishness in adjusting dividends.
A decline in the use of internal funds does not automatically imply an
increase in the debt-equity ratio since external equity can be substituted.
However, if the shortage of internal funds was actually made up with external
debt rather than external equity, it was for some very good reasons. The
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deductibility of interest on debt in deriving taxable income made corporate
debt relatively cheap. The rising inflation that started in 1966 increased the tax
advantage. The fact that inflation created phantom income in the form of
understated depreciation and understated inventory costs in the case of firms
using first-in/first-out made additional tax shelters desirable.

5. Recent comforting circumstances
The economic recovery of 1983 suggests that the immediacy of the treat of
corporate debt has abated somewhat. There have been substantial decreases in
inflation and interest rates have moderated. As measured by the Consumer
Price Index, the inflation rate has declined from 16% in 1980 to 4% in 1983
[17]. As measured by the GNP deflator, the inflation rate has declined over the
period from 11 to 4% [18]. This lower inflation rate indicates that the subsidy
effect available to corporations through interest deductibility should decline
significantly. Interest rates, as measured by the prime rate charged by banks,
also fell from 20.5% in July 1981 to 10.5% in February 1983 [19]. The decline
in interest rates should improve corporate interest coverage ratios and enable
firms presently engaging in speculative financing to avoid any precarious shift
to Ponzi financing. Furthermore, the decline in interest rates should be
associated with decreased volatility and a return of investor preference to
longer term fixed income and equity securities. This shift in preference should
give corporations greater flexibility in matching terms of debt financing with
the useful lives of assets purchased. Finally, longer maturity periods will mean
less frequent turnover of debt and consequently a lesser use of resources in the
financial sector.
Another encouraging aspect of the economic recovery is that corporations
have improved their liquidity ratios [20]. The capacity of corporations to
generate funds internally will alleviate the need for business borrowing in 1984.
A final positive factor is that U.S. industry by November 1983 was
operating at 79.4% of capacity compared with a rate of under 70% a year
earlier [21]. As capacity utilization rates increase there will be concurrent
increases in the demand for fuel, including oil. Nevertheless, to the extent.that
it appears that the present surplus of oil will continue into 1984, the pressure
on prices will be downward [22]. As a result, increased demand for this
resource may not have a significant inflationary impact.

6. Conclusion
While it may be argued that recent developments have improved corporate
financial health somewhat, the fact remains that in the last decade there have
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been significant increases in the debt-equity ratio, and increases in interest
rates, as well as a shortening in the maturity of corporate debt. All of these
factors contributed to a decline in the financial health of corporations from
which they have not fully recovered. Consequently, there has been an increase
in the probability of default of individual firms, and of serious financial
consequences to the economy as a whole. That is undeniable. Even absent an
increase in the interest rates, an increase in corporate debt increases the
probability of default and of serious consequences to the economy as a whole.
An increase in interest rates accentuates that probability of corporate default.
This is especially true if there is not a commensurate increase in earnings. The
decline in the maturity of corporate debt clearly increases the corporate
roll-over risk and evidences a further decline in the financial health of
corporations.
Given the fragility of the financial system, the deterioration of corporate
financial strength is indeed worrisome. The need for concern is somewhat
lessened by the improvements in the world economy in the current recovery.
There remains, however, the very real probability that the magnitude of U.S.
deficits may eventually threaten that recovery. In 1983, the U.S. budget deficit
reached $195 billion or 6.2% of GNP [23]. By comparison, the deficit in 1973
of $8 billion represented only 0.6% of GNP [24]. Interest payments alone on
the current deficit will amount to approximately $20 billion per year [25].
The deficit threatens to be a direct factor in increasing interest rates by
adding to the demand for funds. Furthermore, insofar as it is an inflationary
force, it may induce a monetarist response which would drive interest rates up
again with a net effect of world economic stagnation. This stagnation would
undermine the ability of the LDCs to service their debt, which in turn would
undermine the ability of banks to survive. A series of corporate bankruptcies
would result that would feed on the links interlocking the world's banking
system.
This is a very pessimistic view of the world economy. While excessive
pessimism is unwarranted, the scenario described above is a very real possibility. The fact that corporate financial health and the worldwide financial system
have become fragile, however, does not make collapse inevitable. There is still
time to repair the system.
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that these figures are deceptive. Internal funds are generally considered the summation of profits
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profits can be exaggerated if adequate allowance for depreciation is not made. To the extent that is
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approximation of the operating cash flows that are generated. While we may quarrel about the way
to divide those cash flows into profits and depreciation, the accounting problems do not appear to
affect the total of the two. However, that is deceptive. An inadequate allowance for depreciation
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[17] Fortune Forecast: The Next 18 Months: A Lot of Kick in the Recovery's Second Leg.
Fortune, Jan. 9, 1984. at 42.
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